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LOCAL REGULARITY RESULTS FOR VALUE FUNCTIONS
OF TUG-OF-WAR WITH NOISE AND RUNNING PAYOFF
EERO RUOSTEENOJA
Abstract. We prove local Lipschitz continuity and Harnack’s inequal-
ity for value functions of the stochastic game tug-of-war with noise and
running payoff. As a consequence, we obtain game-theoretic proofs for
the same regularity properties for viscosity solutions of the inhomoge-
neous p-Laplace equation when p > 2.
1. introduction
Max and Minnie play a zero-sum stochastic game as follows. Fix ε > 0.
First a token is placed at x0 ∈ Ω, where Ω ⊂ R
n is a bounded domain. With
probability α ∈ (0, 1) they flip a fair coin and the winner can move the token
anywhere in an open ball Bε(x0). With probability β = 1 − α the token
moves to a random point in Bε(x0). The game continues until the token hits
the boundary of Ω for the first time in, say xτ . Then Minnie pays Max a
total payoff
F (xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
j=0
f(xj),
where F is a bounded final payoff on the boundary and f a positive, bounded
running payoff in Ω. Since β > 0, the game ends almost surely in a finite
time. Max tries to maximize the total payoff and Minnie tries to minimize
it.
For given payoffs and ε > 0, the game has a value uε, which is locally
Lipschitz continuous up to the scale ε. To be more precise, we show in
Theorem 4.1 that if B6R(a) ⊂ Ω and ε < r ≤ R, then
osc(uε, Br(a)) ≤ C
r
R
[osc(uε, B6R(a)) + osc(f,B6R(a))] ,
where C > 0 depends only on p and n. In Theorem 4.2 we show that if
B30r(a) ⊂ Ω, the value function uε satisfies Harnack’s inequality
sup
Br(a)
uε ≤ K( inf
Br(a)
uε + sup
Ω
f),
where K = K(p, n) > 0. In the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 key ideas
are related to controlling the expected cumulative effect of running payoff
during the game under proper strategies.
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According to Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, the value functions satisfy
uε(x) =
α
2
{
sup
Bε(x)
uε + inf
Bε(x)
uε
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(x)
uε dy + ε
2f(x) (1.1)
for all x ∈ Ω. Choosing the probabilities α and β properly, this dynamic pro-
gramming principle (hereafter DPP) gives a connection to viscosity solutions
of the inhomogeneous p-Laplace equation
−
1
p
|∇u|2−p div(|∇u|p−2∇u) =: −∆Np u = f, (1.2)
where p > 2. Let f > 0 be continuous and bounded. If u is a viscosity
solution to (1.2) in Ω with some continuous and bounded boundary values,
by Lemma 5.4 there is a sequence (uε) of value functions converging locally
uniformly to u. By Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, the function u is locally Lipschitz
continuous and satisfies Harnack’s inequality. To the best of our knowledge,
Lipschitz estimate is unavailable in the literature in the case 2 < p ≤ n. In
the case p > n ≥ 2 similar estimates were proven in [7] by using PDE meth-
ods. Harnack’s inequality also follows by utilizing PDE methods described
e.g. in [6, 10]. For recent advances, see e.g. [8].
Tug-of-war games were first introduced by Peres, Schramm, Sheffield and
Wilson in [21] and by Peres and Sheffield in [22]. Various versions of the game
have connections to the theory of nonlinear PDEs. For example, value func-
tions of the tug-of-war approximate infinity harmonic functions and value
functions of the tug-of-war with noise approximate p-harmonic functions.
Game-theoretic arguments have generated many new, intuitive proofs for
uniqueness and regularity properties of infinity harmonic and p-harmonic
functions. See e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 15, 20]. For existence of viscosity solu-
tions to certain parabolic equations, see e.g. [9, 17]. For different versions of
DPP, see e.g. [11].
In Section 2 we define the game, show that it has a value which satisfies
DPP (1.1), and give tools to estimate the value functions under different
strategies and payoffs. In Section 3 we prove lemmas regarding expected
stopping times under specific strategies, local comparison of value functions
and control of infimum. In Section 4 we prove Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. In Sec-
tion 5 we discuss the connection to the inhomogeneous p-Laplace equation.
2. Background of the game
Fix ε > 0 and p > 2. The probabilities in the game are α = (p−2)/(n+p)
and β = (n+ 2)/(n + p). Define
Γε := {x ∈ R
n \Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ ε}
and
Ωε := Ω ∪ Γε.
Then Bε(x) ⊂ Ωε for all x ∈ Ω. The game ends when the token hits Γε for the
first time. In Sections 2, 3 and 4 the payoffs F : Γε → R and f : Ω→ (0,∞)
are bounded and Borel measurable.
Let us briefly describe the stochastic terminology used in this paper.
Strategies SI for Max and SII for Minnie are collections of Borel-measurable
functions that give the next game position given the history of the game.
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When we fix a certain strategy for a player, we usually write SMax
I
for Max
and SMin
II
for Minnie. By a history of the game up to step k we mean a
sequence
(x0, (c1, x1), ..., (ck , xk)),
where x0, ..., xk ∈ Ωε are game positions and cj ∈ C := {0, 1, 2}. Here cj = 0
means that Max wins, cj = 1 that Minnie wins and cj = 2 that a random
step occurs. Our probability space is the space of all game sequences
H∞ := {ω : ω ∈ x0 × (C,Ωε)× ...} .
Put F0 := σ(x0) and
Fk := σ(x0, (c1, x1), ..., (ck , xk))
for k ≥ 1. Note that here (c1, x1), ... are random variables. Then
τ(ω) := inf {k : xk ∈ Γε, k = 0, 1, ...}
is a stopping time relative to the filtration {Fk}
∞
k=0.
The fixed starting point x0 and the strategies SI and SII determine a
unique probability measure Px0SI,SII on the product σ-algebra, see e.g. [15].
The expected total payoff, when starting from x0 and using strategies SI
and SII, is obtained as a sum of final payoff and running payoff
E
x0
SI,SII
[
F (xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
]
:=
ˆ
H∞
(
F (xτ (ω)) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
)
dPx0SI,SII(ω).
The value of the game for Max in x0 ∈ Ω is given by
uεI(x0) := sup
SI
inf
SII
E
x0
SI,SII
[
F (xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
]
,
while the value of the game for Minnie is given by
uεII(x0) := inf
SII
sup
SI
E
x0
SI,SII
[
F (xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
]
.
If a function u is defined in Ωε, u = F on Γε and
u = uεI = u
ε
II
in Ω, then u is the value of the game.
The next two lemmas guarantee that the game has a value which satisfies
DPP (1.1). For similar results without a running payoff, see [16, Theorems
2.1, 2.2, 3.2].
Lemma 2.1. For given payoffs and ε > 0, there is a unique Borel measurable
function uε : Ωε → R, uε = F on Γε, which satisfies DPP (1.1) for all x ∈ Ω.
Proof. First we show the existence. Let (uk)
∞
k=0 be a sequence of functions
Ωε → R such that uk = F on Γε for all k ∈ N, u0 = infΓε F in Ω and
uk+1(x) =
α
2
{
sup
Bε(x)
uk + inf
Bε(x)
uk
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(x)
ukdy + ε
2f(x)
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for all k ∈ N and x ∈ Ω. If k ≥ 1 and uk ≥ uk−1, then
uk+1(x) ≥
α
2
{
sup
Bε(x)
uk−1 + inf
Bε(x)
uk−1
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(x)
uk−1dy + ε
2f(x)
= uk(x)
for all x ∈ Ω. Since f > 0, we have u1 ≥ u0. By induction, the sequence
(uk) is increasing.
The sequence (uk) is also bounded. Let D = diam(Ω) and N = supΩ f .
Note that for any point y0 ∈ Ω there is a sequence (yi)
2D/ε
i=0 for which
|yi+1 − yi| ≤ ε/2 and y2D/ε ∈ Γε. Choose arbitrary k0 ∈ N. We may
assume
sup
Ω
uk0 ≥ sup
Γε
F.
Choose x0 ∈ Ω such that
uk0(x0) >
(
1−
1
2
(α
2
)2D/ε)
sup
Ω
uk0 .
Let (xj)
J
j=0 ⊂ Ωε be a sequence for which |xj+1 − xj| ≤ ε/2, xJ ∈ Γε and
J ≤ 2D/ε. By using the rough estimates
sup
Ωε
uk0−1 ≤ sup
Ω
uk0 ,
inf
Bε(xj)
uk0−1 ≤ uk0(xj)
and DPP we obtain
uk0(x0) ≤
(α
2
+ β
)
sup
Ω
uk0 +
α
2
uk0(x1) + ε
2N.
Repeating this estimate for the values uk0(xj), j ∈ {1, ..., J}, we get
uk0(x0) ≤
(α
2
+ β
)
sup
Ω
uk0
2D/ε∑
j=0
(α
2
)j
+ ε2N
2D/ε∑
j=0
(α
2
)j
≤
(
1−
(α
2
)2D/ε)
sup
Ω
uk0 + 2ε
2N.
Remembering how x0 was chosen, we have
sup
Ω
uk0 ≤ 4ε
2N
(
2
α
)2D/ε
.
Since k0 was arbitrary and the right hand side does not depend on k0, the
sequence (uk) is bounded. Hence it converges pointwise to a bounded, Borel
measurable limit function u. We show that the convergence is uniform.
Suppose not. Since a sequence supΩε(u − uk) is positive, decreasing and
bounded, we have
M = lim
k
sup
Ωε
(u− uk) > 0.
If 1 ≤ k1 ≤ k2, we have
max
{
sup
Bε(x)
uk2 − sup
Bε(x)
uk1 , inf
Bε(x)
uk2 − inf
Bε(x)
uk1
}
≤ sup
Bε(x)
(u− uk1)
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for all x ∈ Ω. Using DPP we estimate
uk2+1(x)− uk1+1(x) ≤ α sup
Bε(x0)
(u− uk1) + β
ˆ
Bε(x)
(u− uk1)dz. (2.1)
Fix δ > 0. Select k1 such that
sup
Ωε
(u− uk1) < M + δ
and
sup
x∈Ω
β
ˆ
Bε(x)
(u− uk1)dz ≤ δ.
Then pick y ∈ Ω such that u(y)− uk1(y) > M − δ, and finally k2 ≥ k1 such
that u(y)− uk2(y) < δ. Then
uk2+1(y)− uk1+1(y) > M − 2δ,
and since α < 1, the estimate (2.1) contradicts the assumption M > 0 when
δ is small enough. Since the convergence is uniform, the limit function u
satisfies DPP (1.1).
In the proof of uniqueness the running payoff plays a minor role, so we
just explain the ideas and refer to the proof of [16, Theorem 2.2] for details.
Assume that u and v are defined in Ωε, satisfy DPP in Ω and u = F = v on
Γε. Assume that u(y) > v(y) for some y ∈ Ω. Since u − v is bounded, we
have
sup
Ω
(u− v) =: M > 0.
Using DPP, we can estimate
u(x)− v(x) ≤
α
2
(
sup
Bε(x)
u(x)− sup
Bε(x)
v(x)
)
+
α
2
(
inf
Bε(x)
u(x)− inf
Bε(x)
v(x)
)
+ β
ˆ
Bε(x)
(u− v)dz + f(x)− f(x)
≤ αM + β
ˆ
Bε(x)
(u− v)dz.
Because of absolute continuity of the integral, a set
G := {x : u(x)− v(x) = M}
is non-empty, and if x0 ∈ G, then u − v = M almost everywhere in a ball
Bε(x0). This contradicts the assumption that G is bounded. A similar
contradiction follows if v(y) > u(y) for some y ∈ Ω. Hence u = v in Ωε. 
Lemma 2.2. Given the payoffs and ε > 0, the tug-of-war with noise and
running payoff has a unique value function uε := u
ε
I
= uε
II
which satisfies
DPP (1.1) in Ω.
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, there is a unique function uε, uε = F in Γε, satisfying
DPP (1.1). We show that
uεII ≤ uε ≤ u
ε
I ≤ u
ε
II.
Since
sup
SI
E
x0
SI,SII
[
F (xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
]
≥ uεI
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for all strategies SII, we get u
ε
I
≤ uε
II
.
Next we show that uε ≤ u
ε
I
. Max follows a strategy SMax
I
in which from
xk−1 he steps to a point xk ∈ Bε(xk−1) so that for fixed η > 0
uε(xk) ≥ sup
Bε(xk−1)
uε − η2
−k.
Minnie uses a strategy SII. Using DPP for uε at a point xk−1, we estimate
E
x0
SMax
I
,SII
[uε(xk) + ε
2
k−1∑
i=0
f(xi)− η2
−k|Fk−1]
≥
α
2
{
sup
Bε(xk−1)
uε − η2
−k + inf
Bε(xk−1)
uε
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(xk−1)
uεdy + ε
2f(xk−1) + ε
2
k−2∑
i=0
f(xi)− η2
−k
= uε(xk−1) + ε
2
k−2∑
i=0
f(xi)− η2
−k(1 + α/2)
≥ uε(xk−1) + ε
2
k−2∑
i=0
f(xi)− η2
−(k−1).
Therefore the process
Mk := uε(xk) + ε
2
k−1∑
i=0
f(xi)− η2
−k
for k ≥ 1, M0 = uε(x0)− η, is a submartingale with respect to the strategies
SMax
I
and SII. Using the Optional Stopping Theorem we obtain
uεI (x0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
E
x0
SI,SII
[
F (xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
]
≥ inf
SII
E
x0
SMax
I
,SII
[
F (xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
f(xi)− η2
−τ
]
= inf
SII
E
x0
SMax
I
,SII
[
uε(xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
f(xi)− η2
−τ
]
≥ inf
SII
E
x0
SMax
I
,SII
[uε(x0)− η]
= uε(x0)− η.
Since η > 0 was arbitrary, we have uε
I
(x0) ≥ uε(x0). Inequality
uεII(x0) ≤ uε(x0)
follows from symmetric argument, so
uε = u
ε
I = u
ε
II
in Ω. Hence uε is the value of the game. 
The next two lemmas are useful tools in estimating the value function.
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Lemma 2.3. Let τ be the stopping time of the game and let τ∗ ≤ τ be a
stopping time with respect to the filtration Fk. Then
uε(y) ≥ inf
SII
E
y
SMax
I
,SII
[
uε(xτ∗) + ε
2
τ∗−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
]
for any fixed strategy SMax
I
, and
uε(y) ≤ sup
SI
E
y
SI,S
Min
II
[
uε(xτ∗) + ε
2
τ∗−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
]
for any fixed strategy SMin
II
.
Proof. We only prove the first inequality, since the second follows from sim-
ilar argument. Max has fixed a strategy SMax
I
. Let η > 0. Minnie follows a
strategy SMin
II
in which from xk−1 ∈ Ω she steps to a point xk ∈ Bε(xk−1) in
which
uε(xk) ≤ inf
Bε(xk−1)
uε + η2
−k.
Let us first prove that
Mk := uε(xk) + ε
2
k−1∑
i=0
f(xi) + η2
−k
for k ≥ 1, M0 = uε(x0) + η, is a supermartingale under the strategies S
Max
I
and SMin
II
.
E
x0
SMax
I
,SMin
II
[Mk|Fk−1]
≤
α
2
{
sup
Bε(xk−1)
uε + inf
Bε(xk−1)
uε + η2
−k
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(xk−1)
uεdy + ε
2
k−1∑
i=0
f(xi) + η2
−k
≤ uε(xk−1) + ε
2
k−2∑
i=0
f(xi) + η2
−(k−1) = Mk−1.
Hence Mk is a supermartingale, and we get
inf
SII
E
y
SMax
I
,SII
[
uε(xτ∗) + ε
2
τ∗−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
]
≤ Ey
SMax
I
,SMin
II
[
uε(xτ∗) + ε
2
τ∗−1∑
i=0
f(xi) + η2
−τ∗
]
≤ Ey
SMax
I
,SMin
II
[M0] = uε(y) + η.
Since η > 0 was arbitrary, the result follows. 
Lemma 2.4. If vε and uε are value functions with payoff functions fv and
Fv for vε, fu and Fu for uε, and fv ≥ fu, Fv ≥ Fu, then vε ≥ uε.
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Proof. Max plays with a strategy SI and Minnie follows a strategy S
Min
II
in
which from xk−1 ∈ Ω she steps to a point xk ∈ Bε(xk−1) in which
v(xk) ≤ inf
Bε(xk−1)
v + η2−k
for some fixed η > 0. Then
E
x0
SI,S
Min
II
[
v(xk) + ε
2
k−1∑
i=0
fu(xi) + η2
−k |Fk−1
]
≤
α
2
{
inf
Bε(xk−1)
v + η2−k + sup
Bε(xk−1)
v
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(xk−1)
vdy
+ ε2
k−1∑
i=0
fu(xi) + η2
−k
≤ v(xk−1) + ε
2
k−1∑
i=0
fu(xi)− ε
2fv(xk−1) + η2
−(k−1)
≤ v(xk−1) + ε
2
k−2∑
i=0
fu(xi) + η2
−(k−1),
since v is a value function and fv ≥ fu. Thus
Mk = v(xk) + ε
2
k−1∑
i=0
fu(xi) + η2
−k
for k ≥ 1, M0 = vε(x0) + η, is a supermartingale. Since Fv ≥ Fu on Γε, we
deduce by the Optional Stopping Theorem that
uε(x0) = inf
SII
sup
SI
E
x0
SI,SII
[
Fu(xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
fu(xi)
]
≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S
Min
II
[
Fv(xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
fu(xi) + η2
−τ
]
≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S
Min
II
[M0] = v(x0) + η.
Since η was arbitrary, this proves the claim. 
3. Stopping time estimates and regularity lemmas
Recall that since the running payoff is positive, the value function uε is
bounded from below by infΓε F . In the proof of Lemma 2.1 we saw that uε
is bounded from above by
max
{
sup
Γε
F, 4ε2
(
2
α
)2 diam(Ω)/ε
sup
Ω
f
}
.
Unfortunately, this upper bound depends on ε. Using the lemmas of section
2, we can now show that the value functions uε for different ε are uniformly
bounded. The idea is to fix for Minnie a strategy in which she tries to push
the token to a certain boundary point. No matter which strategy Max uses,
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the expected value of the stopping time can be estimated so that the total
effect of the running payoff is under control.
Lemma 3.1. For given payoffs F and f , there is C > 0, independent of ε,
such that
uε ≤ C(sup
Γε
F + sup
Ω
f).
Proof. Fix ε > 0 and let x0 ∈ Ω. Choose z ∈ R
n \ Ωε, then r > 0 such that
Br(z) ⊂ R
n \ Ωε, and finally R > 0 such that Ωε ⊂ BR/2(z). Let v be a
solution to the problem
∆v = −2(n+ 2) in BR+ε \Br(z),
v = 0 on ∂Br(z),
∂v
∂ν = 0 on ∂BR+ε(z),
where ∂v∂ν is the normal derivative. As discussed in the proof of [19, Lemma
4.5], the function v is concave in r = |x− z|, satisfies
v(x) =
ˆ
Bε(x)
v dy + ε2 (3.1)
and can be extended as a solution to the same equation to Br(z) \Br−ε(z) so
that equation (3.1) holds also near the boundary ∂Br(z).
The game starts from x0 ∈ Ω. Max plays with any strategy and Minnie
plays with the strategy SMin
II
in which from a point xk−1 ∈ BR(z) she moves
to a point xk for which
v(xk) ≤ inf
Bε(xk−1)
v +
β
α
ε2.
Let τ be the smallest k for which xk ∈ BR(z) \ Ω and τ
∗ the smallest k for
which xk hits the complement of BR(z) \Br(z). Then τ ≤ τ
∗ for any game
sequence (xk). Let us estimate the expected value of τ
∗. By radial concavity
of v we get
E
x0
SI,S
Min
II
[v(xk)|Fk−1] ≤
α
2
{
sup
Bε(xk−1)
v + inf
Bε(xk−1)
v +
β
α
ε2
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(xk−1)
v dy
≤ αv(xk−1) +
β
2
ε2 + β(v(xk−1)− ε
2)
= v(xk−1)−
β
2
ε2.
Hence Mk := v(xk) + k
β
2 ε
2 is a supermartingale. In particular, we have
E
x0
SI,S
Min
II
[Mτ∗ ] ≤ v(x0) ≤ C,
where C is independent of ε. On the other hand, since v(xτ∗) = 0, we have
E [Mτ∗ ] ≥
β
2 ε
2
Eτ∗. Hence
E [τ ] ≤ E [τ∗] ≤ Cε−2.
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Then
uε(x0) ≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S
Min
II
[F (xτ ) + ε
2
τ−1∑
i=0
f(xi)] ≤ C(sup
Γε
F + sup
Ω
f).
Since x0 ∈ Ω and ε > 0 were arbitrary, the proof is complete. 
In the proof of Theorem 4.1 we need the following lemma, which is proven
in the appendix of [15].
Put a token to the point (0, t) ∈ B2r(0) × [0, 2r] ⊂ R
n+1 and fix r > 0.
From a point (xj , tj), with probability α/2 the token moves to the point
(xj , tj− ε), and with the same probability to (xj , tj+ ε). With probability β
the token moves to the point (xj+1, tj), where xj+1 is randomly chosen from
the ball Bε(xj) ⊂ R
n.
Lemma 3.2. The probability that the token does not escape the cylinder
through its bottom is less than
C(p, n)(t+ ε)/r
for all ε > 0 small enough.
Also the next lemma is needed in the proof of Theorem 4.1, because it
describes the expected total effect of the running payoff under the strategies
used there.
Let 0 < ε < t0 < 1 and start a random walk from t0 as follows. From
the point tj−1 we step with probability
α
2 to tj = tj−1 + ε, with the same
probability to tj = tj−1−ε, and with probability β we do not move, tj = tj−1.
The random walk stops when xj ∈ R \ (0, 1) for the first time. Let τ be the
stopping time.
Lemma 3.3. In the random walk described above,
E[τ ] ≤ 5t0α
−1ε−2.
Proof. Since
E[t2j |t0, ..., tj−1] =
α
2
(tj−1 + ε)
2 +
α
2
(tj−1 − ε)
2 + βt2j−1
= t2j−1 + αε
2,
we have
E[(t2j − jαε
2)|t0, ..., tj−1] = t
2
j−1 − (j − 1)αε
2.
Hence also (t2j − jαε
2) is a martingale. Let p = P(xτ ≤ 0). Then
t0 = Etτ ≥ p(−ε) + (1− p) = −p(ε+ 1) + 1.
For the function f : [0,∞) → R, f(x) = (1 − t0)(1 + x)
−1 + x + t0 − 1 it
holds that f(0) = 0 and f
′
≥ 0, so we have
p ≥ (1− t0)(1 + ε)
−1 ≥ 1− t0 − ε.
Since (t2j − jαε
2) is a martingale, we have
t20 = t
2
0 − 0 · αε
2 = E(t2τ − ταε
2)
≤ pε2 + (1− p)(1 + ε)2 − αε2Eτ .
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We can estimate
Eτ ≤ ε−2(pε2 + (1− p)(1 + ε)2 − t20)
= ε−2α−1((1 + ε)2 − t20 + pε
2 − p(1 + ε)2)
≤ ε−2α−1((1 + ε)2 − t20 − p)
≤ ε−2α−1((1 + ε)2 − t20 + t0 + ε− 1)
= ε−2α−1(ε2 + 3ε+ t0 − t
2
0)
≤ ε−2α−1(t0 + 4ε)
≤ 5t0α
−1ε−2.

The next two lemmas are needed in the proof of Harnack’s inequality. The
first is a simple local comparison estimate, and the second gives estimates
for inf uε in balls of radius 2ε < r < 1.
Lemma 3.4. Let uε > 0 be a value function and x, y ∈ BR(z) ⊂ Ω, |x− y| ≤
10ε. Then
uε(x) ≥ (α/2)
20uε(y).
Proof. Start the game from x. Max uses a strategy SMax
I
in which he takes
ε
2 -step towards y, and jumps to y if possible. The game is stopped when the
token reaches either y or Ωε \BR(z). Let this stopping time be τ
∗. Since the
probability to stop at y is bigger than (α/2)20, we obtain from Lemma 2.3
uε(x) ≥ inf
SII
E
x0
SMax
I
,SII
[uε(xτ∗)] + 20ε
2 inf
Ω
f ≥ (α/2)20uε(y).

Lemma 3.5. Let uε > 0 be a value function and B30R(y) ⊂ Ω for some
R > 0. For z ∈ B2R(y) and r ∈ (2ε,R)
inf
Br(z)
uε ≤ Cr
−nuε(y),
where C = C(p, n)
Proof. Without a loss of generality, we may assume that y = 0 and R = 1.
Fix ε > 0 and r ∈ (2ε, 1). Let U = B4(z) \ Br(z). There is no loss of
generality in assuming that 0 ∈ U .
Define
v(x) =
{
(|x− z|2−n − 42−n)(r2−n − 42−n)−1 if n ≥ 3,
log(4/ |x− z|) log(4/r)−1 if n = 2.
Then v is harmonic in U with boundary values{
v = 1 on ∂Br(z),
v = 0 on ∂B4(z).
In both the cases there is a constant c > 0 such that
v(0) ≥ crn.
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The game starts from x0 = 0. Minnie uses any strategy and Max uses
the following strategy SMaxI : In a ball Bε(xk−1), he aims to a point xk where
v(xk) ≥ sup
Bε(xk−1)
v − ηrnε2,
where η > 0 is selected so that the stopping time estimation of the proof of
Lemma 3.1 is at our disposal. The game is stopped at the ε-boundary Γε of
U and employing the boundary values (uε)|Γε . The corresponding stopping
time is τ∗.
We want to estimate the probability of stopping at the inner boundary.
Since y 7→ v(x+ y) is radially decreasing and the map 0 < t 7→ v(x+ ty0)
is convex for any fixed y0 6= 0, we obtain
E
x0
SMax
I
,SII
[v(xk+1)|x0, x1, ..., xk ]
≥
α
2
{
sup
Bε(xk)
v − ηrnε2 + inf
Bε(xk)
v
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(xk)
vdy
≥ αv(xk) + βv(xk)− ηr
nε2 = v(xk)− ηr
nε2.
HenceMk := v(xk)+kηr
nε2 is a submartingale. Denote by P the probability
of stopping at the inner boundary. The optional stopping theorem gives
crn ≤ v(0) = v(x0) ≤ E
x0
SMax
I
,SII
[v(xτ∗) + ηr
nε2τ∗] ≤ 2n+1P + ηC1r
n,
where C1 > 0 is a constant such that Eτ
∗ ≤ C1ε
−2, and the term 2n+1P
comes from the fact that v ≤ 2n+1 in Br(z) \ Br−ε(z). We can select η so
that ηC1 < c. Thus P ≥ c
′rn, where c′ > 0. Using Lemma 2.3 we obtain
uε(0) = uε(x0) ≥ inf
SII
E
x0
SMax
I
,SII
[uε(xτ∗) + ε
2τ∗ inf
Ω
f ]
≥ P inf
Br(z)
uε
≥ c′rn inf
Br(z)
uε.
We get
inf
Br(z)
uε ≤ (c
′rn)−1uε(0) ≤ Cr
−nuε(0),
where C = c′−1. 
4. Lipschitz and Harnack estimates
We are ready to prove the main results, Lipschitz continuity and Har-
nack’s inequality. In the proof of the following theorem we use the cancel-
lation strategy idea that was introduced in the proof of [15, Theorem 3.2].
Because of Lemma 3.3, the running payoff behaves well under this strategy.
Theorem 4.1. Let uε > 0 be a value function and B6R(a) ⊂ Ω, where
R > ε. When ε < r ≤ R, we have
osc(uε, Br(a)) ≤ C
r
R
[osc(uε, B6R(a)) + osc(f,B6r(a))] , (4.1)
where C is a constant depending only on p and n.
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Proof. Take x, y ∈ Br(a), |x− y| ≥ ε, and then z ∈ B2r(a) such that
|x− z| = |y − z| = |x− y| .
When the game starts from x, Minnie plays according to the following can-
cellation strategy SMin
II
: If Max has won more coin tosses than Minnie, then
she cancels one of the moves of Max. Otherwise, she moves towards z length
ε/2 or keeps the token in z. We stop the game if Minnie wins 3 |x− z| /ε
coin tosses more than Max, or if Max wins at least 2R/ε times more than
Minnie, or if the length of the sum of random vectors exceeds 2R. Then
the game stays in B6R. For the game that starts from y, Max follows the
cancellation strategy SMax
I
, and we define stopping time τ∗ as previously.
For this stopping time τ∗ ≤ τ , where τ is the normal stopping time of the
game. Hence Lemma 2.3 is at our disposal.
Notice that by putting
t0 =
3 |x− y|
3 |x− y|+ 2R
,
Lemma 3.3 gives
E[τ∗] ≤ 5α−1
3 |x− y|
3 |x− y|+ 2R
ε−2 ≤ C1
|x− y|
R
ε−2.
Let P be the probability that the game, started from x, ended because
Minnie won more (hereafter Min w). By symmetry, P is also the probability
that the game, started from y, ended because Max won more (hereafter Max
w). Then, because of the cancellation effect, by using Lemma 2.3 we can
estimate
|uε(x)− uε(y)|
≤
∣∣∣P (ExSI,SMinII [uε(xτ )|Min w]− EySMaxI ,SII [uε(xτ )|Max w])∣∣∣
+ (1− P )oscB6R(z0)uε + ε
2
E[τ∗]oscB6R(z0)f
≤ (1 − P )oscB6R(z0)uε + C1 |x− y|R
−1oscB6R(z0)f
≤ C
r
R
[osc(uε, B6R(a)) + osc(f,B6R(a))]
for C = C(p, n), since by Lemma 3.2 we have
1− P ≤ C2 |x− y| /R,
where C2 depends only on p and n.
If x, y ∈ Br and |x− y| < ε, we can take a point z ∈ Br such that
|x− z| ≥ ε and |z − y| ≥ ε. By triangle inequality the estimate follows from
previous estimate. 
Next we prove Harnack’s inequality. The idea is to show that if Harnack’s
inequality does not hold for a fixed, large constant, then by iteration argu-
ment the value functions are unbounded when ε is small. The cumulative
effect of oscillations of the running payoff during iteration seems to cause
trouble, but surprisingly, it is not even necessary to require the running
payoff to be continuous.
14 EERO RUOSTEENOJA
Theorem 4.2. Let uε > 0 be a value function. Assuming B30r(a) ⊂ Ω,
where r > 0, there exists a positive constant K, depending only on p and n,
for which
sup
Br(a)
uε ≤ K( inf
Br(a)
uε + sup
Ω
f).
Proof. Without a loss in generality, we may assume that r = 1 and a = 0.
For convenience of notation, let
N := sup
Ω
f.
First we show that
inf
B1(0)
uε > 0. (4.2)
Suppose not. Then there is a converging sequence (xj) ⊂ B1(0), xj → x0,
such that uε(xj) < 1/j. According to Lemma 3.4,
uε(y) ≥ (α/2)
20uε(x0)
when |y − x0| < 10ε. This is a contradiction, so (4.2) holds.
Pick first a point x1 ∈ B1(0) such that
uε(x1) < 2 inf
B1(0)
uε,
and then a point x2 ∈ B2(x1) such that
M1 := uε(x2) ≥ sup
B2(x1)
uε −N.
For k ≥ 2, let Rk = 2
1−k and pick xk+1 ∈ BRk(xk) such that
Mk := uε(xk+1) ≥ sup
BRk (xk)
uε −N.
We are going to show that
M1 < (2
1+2nC)1+2nuε(x1) + 2N, (4.3)
where C = C(p, n) is a constant such that Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 4.1 are
valid.
On the contrary, suppose that inequality (4.3) does not hold. Put δ :=
(21+2nC)−1. Let us show by induction that the counter assumption yields
Mk ≥ 2C(δRk+1)
−2nuε(x1). (4.4)
Notice first that from a straightforward calculation we get
2C(δRk+1)
−2n = (2Cδ)−k+1(21+2nC)1+2n. (4.5)
By observation (4.5) the case k = 1 holds. Assume that (4.4) holds for k ≤ j.
Let k ∈ {2, ..., j + 1}. Then
inf
BδRk (xk)
uε ≤ C(δRk)
−2nuε(x1) ≤
Mk−1
2
=
uε(xk)
2
, (4.6)
where we used a weakened form of Lemma 3.5 and the induction assumption
that (4.4) holds for k ≤ j.
By Theorem 4.1
osc(uε, BδRk(xk)) ≤ Cδ(osc(uε, BRk(xk)) + osc(f,BRk(xk))),
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or in other words,
osc(uε, BRk(xk)) ≥ (Cδ)
−1osc(uε, BδRk(xk))− osc(f,BRk(xk)). (4.7)
By using first (4.7) and then (4.6) we obtain
Mk ≥ osc(uε, BRk(xk))−N
≥ (Cδ)−1( sup
BδRk (xk)
uε − inf
BδRk (xk)
uε)− osc(f,BRk(xk))−N
≥ (Cδ)−1(u(xk)− 2
−1u(xk))− 2N
= (2Cδ)−1Mk−1 − 2N.
Now we come to an important point, when we want an estimation between
Mj+1 and M1. At first glance it seems that the cumulative effect of the
oscillation of running payoff is an issue, but it turns out to be under control.
We get
Mj+1 ≥ (2Cδ)
−1Mj − 2N
≥ (2Cδ)−1
[
(2Cδ)−1Mj−1 − osc
(
f,BRj (xj)
)]
− 2N
≥ (2Cδ)−jM1 − 2N
j∑
i=1
(2Cδ)−i+1.
Remembering the counter assumption
M1 ≥ (2
1+2nC)1+2nuε(x1) + 2N
and noticing that 2Cδ = 2−2n < 1/2, we obtain
Mj+1 ≥ (2Cδ)
−j(21+2nC)1+2nuε(x1) + 2N
[
(2Cδ)−j −
j∑
i=1
(2Cδ)−i+1
]
≥ (2Cδ)−j(21+2nC)1+2nuε(x1).
Taking into account the observation (4.5), the induction is complete.
Take k0 such that δRk0 ∈ (2ε, 4ε]. By Lemma 3.4,
inf
BδRk0
(xk0 )
uε ≥ (α/2)
20 sup
BδRk0
(xk0 )
uε.
By using Lemma 3.5 and inequality (4.4) we obtain
(α/2)−20 ≥
supBδRk0 (xk0 )
uε
infBδRk0 (xk0 )
uε
≥
uε(xk0)
C(δRk0)
−nuε(x1)
=
Mk0−1
C(δRk0)
−nuε(x1)
≥
(2Cδ)2−k0(21+2nC)1+2n
C(δ21−k0)−n
≥ Ĉ(Cδ2n+1)−k0 = Ĉ2nk0 ,
where Ĉ is independent of k0. This is a contradiction when k0 is big enough,
or in other words, when ε is small enough. Therefore inequality (4.3) holds
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and we get
sup
B1(0)
uε ≤ sup
B2(x1)
uε ≤M1 +N ≤ (2
1+2nC)1+2nuε(x1) + 3N
≤ 2(21+2nC)1+2n inf
B1(0)
uε + 3 sup
Ω
f
≤ K( inf
B1(0)
uε + sup
Ω
f),
where K depends only on p and n. 
5. Relation to PDE
In this section we study local reqularity of viscosity solutions to the in-
homogeneous p-Laplace equation
−∆Np u = f (5.1)
in Ω. As before, p > 2. In the whole section f > 0 is continuous and
bounded in Ω, and boundary values of viscosity solutions are required to be
continuous and bounded. Recall that
∆Np u =
1
p
|∇u|2−p∆pu
is the normalized p-Laplacian. Here
∆pu = div(|∇u|
p−2∇u) = |∇u|p−2 ((p − 2)∆N∞u+∆u),
where
∆N∞u = |∇u|
−2∆∞u = |∇u|
−2 〈D2u ∇u,∇u〉 .
By [12, Proposition 3], we can define viscosity solutions to (5.1) as follows.
Definition 5.1. A continuous function u is a viscosity solution to (5.1) at
x ∈ Ω, if and only if every C2-function φ, ∇φ(x) 6= 0 or D2φ(x) = 0, that
touches u from below in x ∈ Ω, satisfies
−∆Np φ(x) ≥ f(x),
and every C2-function φ, ∇φ(x) 6= 0 or D2φ(x) = 0, that touches u from
above in x ∈ Ω, satisfies
−∆Np φ(x) ≤ f(x).
Note that if a test function φ satisfies ∇φ(x) = 0 and D2φ(x) = 0 for
some x ∈ Ω, by the convergence argument explained in [12] we can set
∆Np φ(x) = 0.
The idea for showing local regularity properties for viscosity solutions to
(5.1) is to notice that viscosity solutions can be approximated uniformly by
value functions of tug-of-war with noise and running payoff. We need the
following Arzela-Ascoli-type lemma, which is proven in [19, Lemma 4.2].
Lemma 5.2. Let
{
uε : Ω→ R, ε > 0
}
be a uniformly bounded set of func-
tions such that given η > 0, there are constants r0 and ε0 such that for every
ε < ε0 and any x, y ∈ Ω with |x− y| < r0 it holds that
|uε(x)− uε(y)| < η.
Then there exists a uniformly continuous function u : Ω → R and a subse-
quence still denoted by uε such that uε → u uniformly in Ω as ε→ 0.
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Let u be a viscosity solution to (5.1) in Ω. We may assume 0 ∈ Ω. Choose
R > 0 such that B2R(0) ⊂ Ω. Let uε, 0 < ε < R, be the value function of
tug-of-war with noise and running payoff in BR(0), where running payoff is
f from equation (5.1), and final payoff is u on the boundary strip
Γε = {x ∈ Ω \BR(0) : dist(x, ∂BR(0)) ≤ ε} .
Lemma 5.3. The sequence (uε), defined in BR(0) ∪ Γε as described above,
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 5.2 in BR(0).
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, the sequence (uε) is uniformly bounded in BR(0). Fix
η > 0. Since u is uniformly continuous in BR(0) ∪ Γε, there is r1 > 0 such
that x, y ∈ BR(0) ∪ Γε, |x− y| < r1, implies
|u(x)− u(y)| < η/2.
When x, y ∈ ∂BR(0), the same estimate holds between uε(x) and uε(y) for
all 0 < ε < R, since uε = u on Γε.
Let us next work out the case x ∈ BR(0), y ∈ ∂BR(0). Select 0 < s <
S < r1 and z ∈ Γε such that y ∈ ∂Bs(z) and B2S(z) ⊂ BR(0)∪Γε. Consider
a function v : B2S(z) \Bs(z)→ R,
∆v = −4(n + 2) supΩ f in B2S(z) \Bs(z),
v = supBR(z) u on ∂Bs(z),
v = supΓε u on ∂B2S(z).
Note that this function satisfies
v(a) =
ˆ
Bε(a)
vdy + 2ε2 sup
Ω
f
when Bε(a) ⊂ B2S(z) \Bs(z).
Let r2 < S − s be so small that
sup
Br2 (y)
v < sup
BS(z)
u+ η/2.
Pick x ∈ Br2(y) ∩ BR(0). Since |x− y| < S − s, by the triangle inequality
x ∈ BR(0) ∩BS(z). Let ε < S. We start a game from x0 = x. Minnie plays
with the following strategy SMin
II
: at xk−1, she aims to a point xk where
v(xk) ≤ inf
Bε(xk−1)
v +
1
2
ε2 sup
Ω
f.
We stop the game when xk ∈ B2S(z) \ (BS(z) ∩ BR(0)) for the first time.
Let this stopping time be τ∗.
Max plays with a strategy SI. From radial convexity of v we obtain
E
x0
SI,S
Min
II
(v(xk)|Fk−1)
≤
α
2
{
sup
Bε(xk−1)
v + inf
Bε(xk−1)
v +
1
2
ε2 sup
Ω
f
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(xk−1)
vdy
≤ αv(xk−1) +
α
4
ε2 sup
Ω
f + βv(xk−1)− 2ε
2 sup
Ω
f
≤ v(xk−1)− ε
2 sup
Ω
f.
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Hence Mk := v(xk) + kε
2 supΩ f is a supermartingale and we obtain
uε(x0) ≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S
Min
II
[
uε(xτ∗) + ε
2
τ∗−1∑
i=0
f(xi)
]
≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S
Min
II
[
v(xτ∗) + τ
∗ε2 sup
Ω
f
]
≤ v(x0).
We conclude that when x ∈ BR(0), y ∈ ∂BR(0), |x− y| < r2 and ε < S, we
have
|uε(x)− uε(y)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣uε(x0)− supBS(z)∩Γε u
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ supBS(z)∩Γε u− uε(y)
∣∣∣∣∣ < η.
Finally, let us examine the case x, y ∈ BR(0). If dist(x, ∂BR(0)) < r2/5
and |x− y| < r2/5, there is y0 ∈ ∂BR(0) such that |x− y0| < r2 and
|y − y0| < r2. Then
|uε(x)− uε(y)| < 2η.
Hence we can assume that x, y ∈ BR−r2/3(0), and the asymptotic estimate
|uε(x)− uε(y)| < η
follows straightforwardly from Theorem 4.1. 
The ideas in the proof of Lemma 5.4 are similar to those used in the proof
of [19, Theorem 4.9], where the uniform limit of the value functions of tug-
of-war with noise was shown to be a viscosity solution to the homogeneous
p-Laplace equation.
Lemma 5.4. Let u be a viscosity solution to (5.1) in Ω and B2R(0) ⊂ Ω.
Then u can be approximated uniformly by value functions of tug-of-war with
noise and running payoff in BR(0).
Proof. Let (uε) be a sequence of value functions in BR(0) with final payoff
u and running payoff
f =
pβ
2(n + 2)
f.
By Lemma 5.2, it follows from Lemma 5.3 that there is a uniformly continu-
ous function v in BR(0), v = u on ∂BR(0), such that there is a subsequence
of (uε) converging uniformly to v in BR(0) when ε→ 0. For convenience of
notation, we denote this subsequence (uε). We are going to show that the
function v is a viscosity solution to (5.1) in BR(0). By comparison principle
(see e.g. [12, Theorem 5], and also [?]), we will conclude that v = u in BR(0).
Choose a point x ∈ BR(0). We only work out the supersolution part, since
the subsolution part is similar. Let φ ∈ C2(B), ∇φ(x) 6= 0 or D2φ(x) = 0,
be defined in a neighborhood B of x, touching v from below in x. We need
to show that
p(∆Np φ(x) + f(x)) = (p− 2)∆
N
∞φ+∆φ+ pf(x) ≤ 0. (5.2)
If ∇φ(x) = 0 and D2φ(x) = 0, we have ∆Np φ(x) = 0 and inequality (5.2)
cannot hold. Hence we can assume ∇φ(x) 6= 0. From Taylor expansion
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results in [18] it follows that there is a point xε ∈ Bε(x) in the direction of
∇φ(x) such that
α
2
{
sup
Bε(x)
φ+ inf
Bε(x)
φ
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(x)
φ(y)dy − φ(x)
≥
βε2
2(n + 2)
(
(p− 2)
〈
D2φ(x)
(
xε − x
|xε − x|
)
,
(
xε − x
|xε − x|
)〉
+∆φ(x)
)
+ o(ε2).
Since v is the uniform limit of the sequence (uε), there is a sequence
(xε) ⊂ B converging to x so that
uε(y)− φ(y) ≥ −ε
3
when y ∈ Bε(xε). Using the DPP characterization of uε we obtain
ε3 ≥ −φ(xε) +
α
2
{
sup
Bε(x)
φ+ inf
Bε(x)
φ
}
+ β
ˆ
Bε(x)
φ(y)dy
+ ε2f(xε).
Hence
−ε3 ≥
βε2
2(n+ 2)
(
(p − 2)
〈
D2φ(x)
(
xε − x
|xε − x|
)
,
(
xε − x
|xε − x|
)〉
+∆φ(x)
)
+ ε2f(xε) + o(ε
2).
Since f is continuous and ∇φ(x) 6= 0, dividing by ε2 and then letting ε→ 0
we get
0 ≥
β
2(n + 2)
(
(p− 2)∆N∞φ(x) + ∆φ(x)
)
+ f(x).
Remembering how the running payoff f was chosen, we have
0 ≥
β
2(n+ 2)
(
(p− 2)∆N∞φ(x) + ∆φ(x) + pf(x)
)
.
Hence v is a viscosity supersolution to (5.1) in BR(0). By similar argument
v is also a viscosity subsolution, hence a viscosity solution. By the discussion
in the beginning of the proof, the proof is complete. 
Theorem 5.5. Nonnegative viscosity solutions of (5.1) are locally Lipschitz
continuous and satisfy Harnack’s inequality.
Proof. By previous lemma, each viscosity solution can be approximated lo-
cally uniformly by value functions. Hence, Harnack’s inequality for viscosity
solutions follows immediately from Theorem 4.2. By Theorem 4.1, value
functions are locally Lipschitz continuous up to the scale ε with a Lipschitz
constant depending only on p and n. Therefore viscosity solutions are locally
Lipschitz continuous. 
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